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Abstract 
 
In recent years the study of national and civic identities in the later Ottoman 
period has revealed huge degrees of complexity among previously 
homogenised groups, none more so that the Jewish population of the Sublime 
State. Those Jews who moved to the Ottoman Empire from the 1880s as part 
of a burgeoning expression of Jewish nationalism developed a complex 
relationship with an Ottomanist identity that requires further consideration. 
Through an examination of the Hebrew-language press in Palestine, run 
largely by immigrant Zionist Jews, complemented by the archival records of 
the Ottoman state and parliament, this paper aims to show the complexities 
of the engagement between Ottoman and Jewish national identities. The 
development of Jewish nationalism by largely foreign Jews came with an 
increase in suspicion from the Ottoman elites, sometimes manifesting itself 
in outright anti-Semitism, and strong expressions of nationalism in the 
Hebrew press were denounced both by Ottoman and non- and anti-nationalist 
Jewish populations. The controversy over immigrant Jewish land purchases 
in Palestine from the 1890s led to a number of discussions over how far 
foreign Jews could and should embrace an Ottoman cultural and political 
identity, with cultural, labour, and political Zionists taking different positions. 
The issue of Ottomanisation should also be taken in the context of the post-
1908 political landscape in the Ottoman Empire, with separatist nationalisms 
increasingly under the spotlight, and the debates among the different forms 
of Jewish nationalism increasingly focusing on the limits of performative and 
civic Ottoman nationalism1
                                                          
1The author would like to thank Dikla Braier for her patient advice and assistance with a 
number of the more obscure passages within some of the Hebrew texts examined, and to 
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have been rendered in the modern Turkish script in a published collection.  
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Introduction 
 
Ottomanism, the ideal of political equality for all the Ottoman Empire’s diverse 
subjects-cum-citizens under a shared civic allegiance, existed in conjunction 
with a number of other isms vying for elite and popular support in the final 
decades of the empire’s existence. One of these ideologies, Zionism, seemed 
to be yet another of the national identities threatening to destroy the Sublime 
State from within and to disrupt the Ottomanist ideal that aimed to unify the 
empire’s different ethnic and religious groups. Zionism, however, was more 
than a local identity; it was a growing international movement that 
incorporated a number of contrasting and even conflicting ideologies. 
Zionism, with its programme of settling foreign Jews, often from the Ottoman 
archenemy, Russia, in Ottoman Palestine, posed a particular threat to the 
Ottoman state.2 Such Jewish immigrants were therefore not Ottoman Jews 
who might embrace (or not) the vision of Ottomanism, but rather foreigners 
who, in order to further their national aims, required Ottomanisation through 
new processes of citizenship. 
 
Zionism aimed to build a national home for a territorially stateless and 
demographically and linguistically disparate group of people. As part of the 
formation of a Jewish national identity, Hebrew was ‘revived’ as the national 
language, creating a print and literary culture intrinsically linked to the 
Zionist cause.3 Choosing the liturgical tongue as the new communal 
vernacular was intended to facilitate a cultural as well as national 
renaissance, what Michelle Campos has referred to as “cultural Hebraism”.4 
Hebrew works were censored in certain periods and, consequently, self- 
censored, meaning that expressions of loyalty to the state were a recurring 
theme; however, Hebrew loyalism was not the same as Zionist Ottomanism. 
But in seeking to establish a national identity within an imperial space where 
                                                          
2 For Zionism in the Ottoman context in general, see: Michelle Campos, Ottoman Brothers: 
Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth Century Palestine (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2011) especially 201–18; Yuval Ben-Bassat & Eyal Ginio (eds.), Late 
Ottoman Palestine: The Period of Young Turk Rule (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Mim Kemal 
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3See: Ghil’ad Zuckermann, “A New Vision of Israeli Hebrew: Theoretical and Practical 
Implications of Analysing Israel’s Main Language as a Semi-Engineered Semito-European 
Hybrid Language”, Journal of Modern Jewish Studies 5, no. 1 (2006): 57–71.  
4 Campos, Ottoman Brothers, 207f. 
individuals were defined not just by confession or ethnicity but by 
internationally recognized citizenship, Zionist immigrants from beyond the 
borders of the Ottoman realms were faced with the prospect of becoming 
Ottoman through Ottomanisation (hitʿatmanut) in order to pursue and 
consolidate Jewish settlement in Palestine, something that was possible 
through the Ottoman citizenship law of 1869, which permitted naturalisation 
for foreign subjects after five years of residency.5 It is through this seemingly 
self-contradictory idea of the realisation of Zionism through Ottomanism that 
the complexities of nationalist discourse in the late Ottoman state can be 
examined. The Hebrew press in Palestine in the later Hamidian (1876–1909) 
and Second Constitutional (1908–1920) periods provides an interesting 
insight into how some proponents of different forms of Jewish nationalism 
engaged with a civic Ottoman identity. This article will examine a number of 
Hebrew-language newspapers based in Ottoman Palestine aimed at a largely 
immigrant Jewish audience, building on the survey undertaken by Ruth Kark 
and Nadav Solomonovich of the Hebrew press between 1908 and 1918 and 
on the important framework of ‘Ottoman brotherhood’ put forward by Michelle 
Campos vis-à-vis Ottoman Jews, as well as documents from the Ottoman 
archives in Istanbul and the records of the Ottoman parliament, in order to 
consider how burgeoning Zionist identities interacted with an equally nascent 
sense of Ottomanism.6  
 
It aims to illustrate the tensions and interactions between these two 
national ideologies: the tropes of loyalty displayed within the Hebrew press, 
the limits of the Zionist national discourse within an Ottoman sphere, and 
attempts to Ottomanise Zionism through the narratives developed by the 
mitʿatmanim, those immigrant Jews ‘who became Ottomans’. Ultimately, this 
article will consider how far Ottomanism as the articulation of inter- and 
intracommunal unity within the Ottoman polity was a performative ideology, 
                                                          
5 Campos, Ottoman Brothers, 61; Kemal Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political 
History: Selected Articles and Essays (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 113ff. For the text of the 1869 
law, see: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri (BOA), A.Y.EE.41/133. 
6 Ruth Kark & Nadav Solomonovich, “The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 as Reflected in the 
Media of the Jewish Community in Palestine”, in Ben Bassat & Ginio, Late Ottoman Palestine: 
183–209. For a discussion of politics in the Ladino press, see: Yaron Ben Naeb, “The Zionist 
Struggle as Reflected in the Jewish Press in Istanbul in the Aftermath of the Young Turk 
Revolution, 1908–1918”, in Ben-Basset & Ginio, Late Ottoman Palestine: 241–58. Michelle 
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Campos, Ottoman Brothers, particularly 74–81; Campos, “Between ‘Beloved Ottomania’ and 
‘The Land of Israel’: The Struggle over Ottomanism and Zionism among Palestine’s Sephardi 
Jews, 1908–13”, IJMES 37, no. 4 (2005): 461–83. 
  
 
with different groups of Jewish nationalists participating to varying degrees 
as actors constructing overlapping national identities. 
 
“In France, Everything Is French”: Ideas and Perceptions of Jewish 
Identity and Zionism 
 
In 1888, the prolific Ottoman writer, publisher, and politician, Ebüzziya Tevfik 
Bey, published a polemic history of the Jews of Europe, Millet-I İsrāʾilīye, 
examining their religion and history, and discussing their persecution and 
social status. How one translates the title of this book, as either ‘The Israelite 
Community’ or ‘The Israelite Nation’, is quite important; by the later 19th 
century, the idea of the millet had moved from being one based around a 
religious community or confession to a broader sense of a political nation. 
Within this text, Ebüzziya Tevfik expressed a number of anti-Semitic 
prejudices, claiming that “the Jews are held to be a most despicable and 
contemptible nation (en ẕelil ve ḥaḳīr bir millet) by the peoples of both Islam 
and Christendom, and at the same time they pretend themselves to be the 
most noble of peoples (eşref-iāḳvām)”.7 The contradiction between the 
supposed low status of the Jews and their purported arrogance was a familiar 
anti-Semitic trope, with their statelessness a key piece of evidence. However, 
an encounter in Istanbul caused Ebüzziya Tevfik to reconsider the 
complexities of Jewish national identities. In a section of the book headed ‘A 
Digression’ (İstiṭrād), he narrated a conversation with a French bookseller in 
Galatasaray not long after the news of the French defeat in the Franco-
Prussian War (1870–1) reached the Ottoman capital: 
 
Me: What is the matter, Monsieur Romp, has something distressed 
you? 
Bookseller: Are you aware, my dear, of the great grief caused by the 
catastrophe that has befallen our fatherland? 
Me: (Smiling) But you are not French, what is it to you? 
Bookseller: What’s that?! I’m not French?! If I’m not French, what 
am I?! 
Me: My dear, are you not a Jew? 
Bookseller: (The smile on his face being replaced by an expression 
of offence) I beg your pardon, monsieur! In France, everything is 
French. [(Çehresi bir tebessüm münfaʿilene peydā ederek) ʿAfv 
edersiniz mösyö! Fransa’da herşey Fransızdır.]8 
 
                                                          
7 Ebüzziya Tevfik, Millet-i İsrāʾilīye (Kostaniniye: Matbaa-ı Ebüzziya, 1305 [1888]), 5f. 
8 Tevfik, Millet-i İsrāʾilīye, 58. 
This last statement came as something of a revelation to Ebüzziya Tevfik, and, 
by his own admission, the notion that a Jew could be a patriot was a powerful 
idea indeed:  
 
My mind was filled with a reminiscence that had been ingrained 
from my youth, resulting in an overwhelming feeling caused by 
the thoughtless insult I had given to the patriotic honour of 
another Turk (bilā teʾemmül bir ġayr-ı Türk’ün ḥaysiyet-i 
vaṭanpervānesini taḥḳīr etmiş olduġumdan); from my shame, I 
came to view that person in another light, and now I chastise 
myself at the recall of that memory.9  
 
This was a moral tale in national identity and patriotism; if a Jew from France 
could be a loyal Frenchman, then an Ottoman Jew could be a loyal Ottoman. 
This was an idea at the heart of Ottomanism, that regardless of confession or 
other identities, Ottoman subjects were united by their being Ottoman. 
On the other side of the patriotic scale was Jewish nationalism, a key 
moment in the development of which was the publication of Theodore Herzl’s 
Der Judenstaat in 1896. Herzl lamented that “in vain are we loyal, and in some 
places even exuberant patriots”, positing the solution to Europe’s Judenfrage 
as the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state, with Palestine as a preferred 
location.10 However, Herzl noted the difficulties posed by “experiments in 
colonisation” (Colonisirungsversuche), through the “false principle of gradual 
infiltration of Jews” (nach dem falschen Princip der allmäligen Inflitration von 
Juden), warning that “such infiltration must always end badly, for it often 
continues until the moment when the local population feels threatened, and 
at their insistence the government blocks the further influx of Jews”.11 Indeed, 
the Ottoman authorities became increasingly aware of such colonial aims in 
Palestine. Some fifteen years after Der Judenstaat’s publication, the bilingual 
(Ottoman Turkish and French) satirical magazine Djem/Cem published an 
article referencing a heated debate in the Ottoman parliament that had raised 
the ‘Zionist Question’. Mocking a number of anti-Semitic tropes, the author 
of this piece, writing under the pen name ‘Gros Pierre’, declared that “this 
project is no longer in the realms of fantasy, and we are at the same time to 
understand that it is already underway”, before announcing that the king of 
this new Kingdom of Israel (Royaume d’Israël) would be the British Jewish 
                                                          
9 Ibid., 58f.  
10 Theodore Herzl, Der Judenstaat: Versuch einer Modernen Lösung der Judenfrage (Leipzig & 
Wien: M. Breitenstein’s Verlags-Buchhandlung, 1896), 11. See: Anita Shapira, “Anti-
Semitism and Zionism”, Modern Judaism 15, no. 3 (1995): 215–32. 
11 Herzl, Der Judenstaat, 28. 
banker Sir Ernest Cassel, a founding member of the National Bank of 
Turkey.12 
The article referenced a speech by İsmaʿil Hakkı Bey, deputy for Gümülcine 
(Komotini), made during a discussion about the Ottoman debt problems in 
March 1910. During a heated exchange, İsmaʿil Hakkı declared that the “loan 
question” (istikraz meselesi) was not simply economic or political, but part of 
a question of Zionist aspirations (Siyonist âmâli meselesidir).13 The deputy for 
Tokat, İsmaʿil Paşa, protested that this was an exaggeration and a lie (bunda 
bir parça mübalağa ettin, yalan söyledin), but İsmaʿil Hakkı continued: “This 
is not about the Jews [...] Perhaps following from certain corruptive political 
intentions and, more often than not, from certain sections found in certain 
states in Europe, this is about the Zionists.”14 He proceeded to make links 
between European Jews involved in financial institutions lending money to 
the Ottoman state and the policies of the ruling Committee of Union and 
Progress, accusing Grand Vizier İsmaʿil Hakkı Paşa and Interior Minister 
Mehmed Talʿat Bey of being in the pockets of bankers such as Ernest Cassel 
and of permitting Jewish immigration.15 At one point in his speech, İsmaʿil 
Hakkı declared: 
 
So far I have briefly discussed what Zionism is, and from which point they 
are able to enter into the business of loans. Subsequently, the Finance 
Minister [Mehmed] Cavid Bey, without knowing, without understanding 
the risks – perhaps such heedlessness can be found in people, this is true 
of everyone – was tricked into these actions by those crafty people, and by 
enabling the advancement of this idea and its cause has its true path 
become readily apparent. Moreover, let me tell you right now, that this 
Zionism is a chronic disease within us, a political disease, and it has begun 
to have a terrible effect upon us (bu Siyonizm bizim dahilimizde bir marazı 
müzmin, bir marazı siyâsi ve müthiş gibi tesirat icra etmeye başlamıştır). 
[…] With a completely clear and completely evident definition, Zionism is: 
the greatest possible increase and augmentation of foreign Jews in the land 
of Palestine, in the valley of the Shatt al-Arab, and in Noble Jerusalem and 
its environs, and there, through the benefit of a concentration of 
                                                          
12Djem/Cem no.18, 11 March 1911 / 26 Şubat 1326. On Cassel, see: Marian Kent, “Agent of 
Empire? The National Bank of Turkey and British Foreign Policy”, The Historical Journal 18, 
no. 2 (1975): 367–89; Pat Thane, “Financiers and the British State: The Case of Sir Ernest 
Cassel”, Business History 28, no. 1 (1986): 80–99. 
13 Meclesi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi: Kırkdokuzuncu İnikad, 16 Şubat 1326 (1910) Çarşamba, 
Devre 1, Cilt 3, İçtima Senesi 3, 331. 
14 Meclesi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi 1:3:3. 
15 Ibid., 331–36. 
population, to form an Israelite government (nüfusun kesâfetinden 
blilstifade bir hükümet-i İsrailiye teşkil etmektir).16 
 
Here, the implication was of treachery from within as well as without, as 
Mehmed Cavid Bey was of a Dönme family from Salonica.17 Two Jewish 
deputies, Nisim Mazelyah Efendi from Izmir and ʿEmanüʾel Karasu Efendi 
from Salonica, rose to counter, with Nisim Mazelyah warning İsmaʿil Hakkı 
that “you do not appreciate the consequence of your words, and you do not 
conceive of how much strife and agitation (o kadar fitne, fesat) you are causing 
by speaking them”.18 Zionism featured in other debates on state debt and 
finances in 1910, such as a sarcastic comment of Yorgo Boşo Efendi, deputy 
for Serifçe (Servia), that he would not ask where the finance minister might 
find the necessary money for the budget deficit, “whether it was from Zionists 
or Masons.”19 In such discussions, anti-Semitic tropes mixed with concerns 
about immigration levels and challenges to Ottoman authority at the same 
time that Jewish identities were being challenged and (re)formulated in both 
Europe and the Ottoman Empire. It is against this backdrop that the Hebrew-
language press, fairly recently established in Palestine, came under scrutiny 
for its links with Zionism, and itself debated the role of Jewish nationalism in 
the Ottoman state, and the limits of an Ottomanist identity for Jewish settlers. 
  
Balancing Eretz and Arāżī: Jewish Nationalism and Ottoman 
Suspicions of the Hebrew Press 
 
A report from Salonica in 1903 detailed an issue that came to official 
attention via a campaign run in a Vienna-based paper, Die Zionistische Welt 
– presumably referring to Herzl’s Die Welt – at the heart of which was the 
Hebrew language: 
 
The Salonica society within this ideology is called “Kadima” [Heb. 
‘forward’], a Jewish organisation that, although operating under 
the ostensible aim of spreading the Hebrew language, holds the 
actual aim of disseminating the fallacious ideas contained in 
‘Zionism’, that is, the giving of Noble Jerusalem [to the Jews]; this 
was made known to the exalted interior ministry in a special 
report a year ago.20 
                                                          
16 Ibid., 331. 
17 Marc Baer, The Dönme: Jewish Converts, Muslim Revolutionaries, and Secular Turks 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 97–108. 
18 Meclesi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi 1:3:3, 331. 
19 Meclesi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi: Ellibirinci İnikad, 19 Şubat 1326 (1910) Cumartesi, 395f. 
20 BOA, DH.MKT 747/5, undated letter from the Salonica province to the Interior Ministry 
(1903). 
 
Moreover, Die Zionistische Welt had run a campaign the previous month to 
collect funds to build a large school in Jerusalem for 200 Jewish children from 
Kishinev, following a major pogrom there in April 1903. The report feared that 
this would be “a source of discontent” (bir menbaʿ-ı fesād) in Jerusalem, a 
view echoed by the Ottoman Interior Ministry, revealing three main themes 
that helped to construct the relationship between the Hebrew press and the 
Ottoman state.21 First, Zionism was seen as a separatist nationalism, aimed 
at the “the giving of Noble Jerusalem [to the Jews]” (Ḳudüs-ü Şerīf’in 
Mūsevīlere iʿṭāsı). Second, the Hebrew language was seen as a smokescreen 
for political movements propagating “fallacious ideas” (efkār-ı bāṭılasını): 
Salonican society’s efforts to promote Hebrew were only superficial (maḳṣad-ı 
ẓāhirī) compared to its true aims (maḳṣad-ı aṣlī) of promoting Zionism. Third, 
any institutions or organisations engaged in the promotion of Hebrew could 
be seen as aiming to weaken Ottoman authority in Palestine by using Hebrew 
education to bring about a separate Jewish polity, both by educating young 
Ottoman Jews about Zionism, and by bringing in Jewish children from abroad 
to study in their schools. 
Education was crucial, as schools were a key institution developing 
notions of shared citizenship, civic values, and loyalty to the state.22 Schools 
provided by missionary groups and other foreign organisations were a direct 
challenge to the development of Ottomanism as a socially coherent identity. 
The official yearbook of the Ottoman Education Ministry in 1903 reveals that 
the 6 Ottoman high schools (mekātib-i iʿdādīye) in the Beirut province and the 
Jerusalem governorate had a total of 944 students enrolled, of whom 935 were 
Muslim and a mere 9 were non-Muslim.23 By contrast, the Ottoman non-
Muslim high schools had 786 students enrolled, and the foreign-run high 
schools, which mainly catered to non-Muslims, had 3,173 students in their 
classrooms. At the level below, the middle schools (mekātib-i rüşdīye), there 
were 1,100 students in the Ottoman state schools, 1,352 in the Ottoman non-
Muslim schools, and 2,541 in the foreign-run schools. This meant that 
Ottoman state schools held just a fifth of pupils. 
Not all of the Jewish schools would have taught Hebrew, but the growing 
demand for Hebrew literature, both liturgical and secular, meant that seven 
                                                          
21 BOA, DH.MKT 747/5, undated letter from the Salonica province to the Interior Ministry 
(1903); BOA, DH.MKT 747/5, Dāḥiliye mektūbi ḳalemi, no.235, 9 Cemaziülevvel 1321 / 21 
Temmuz 1319 (3 August 1903). 
22 Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1908–1918 (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 23f. On 
education in the later Ottoman period, see: Benjamin Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam, the 
State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
23 Sālnāme-i Neẓāret-i Maʿārif-i ʿUmūmiye ([Istanbul]: Asr Matbaası, 1321 [1903]), 416–33; 
727–34. 
 
publishing houses were recorded as printing works in Hebrew in Jerusalem 
in 1903, almost as many as were listed as printing in Arabic.24 The Hebrew 
newspapers in Palestine had a variety of audiences and aims.25 Ḥavatzelet 
(Lily), first appearing in 1863 and refounded in and edited from 1870 by the 
Russian immigrant Israʾel Dov Frumkin, was primarily aimed at the Hasidic 
community and other immigrants of the “Old Yishuv”, aside from a brief 
period when the Hebrew revivalist, Jewish nationalist, and Russian 
immigrant Eliʿezer Ben-Yehuda made major contributions to the paper in the 
early 1880s, introducing an editorial angle encouraging mass Jewish 
immigration to Palestine that reappeared in the paper’s subsequent history. 
Ben-Yehuda went on to found and edit a number of newspapers from a Jewish 
nationalist perspective, notably Ha-Tzevi (The Gazelle) from 1884 – changed 
to Ha-Or (The Light) from 1910 – aimed at the “New Yishuv” of Jewish 
immigrants to Palestine, challenging religious orthodoxy in favour of a modern 
nationalist discourse. Linked to this paper was another Ben-Yehuda 
publication with a similar political message, Ha-Shḳafah (The Viewpoint), 
published between 1896 and 1908. Other Jewish perspectives were 
represented in the labour Zionist paper Ha-Poʿel Ha-Tzaʿyir (The Young 
Worker), published from 1907 and largely run by another Russian immigrant, 
Yosef Aharonovitch. Finally, Ha-Ḥerut (The Freedom) was run by and aimed 
at the Ottoman Sephardic community with a Jewish nationalist perspective, 
edited by a native Jerusalemite, Avraham Elmalih. 
The Ottoman authorities tried to monitor Hebrew-language publications 
for nationalist sedition and were assisted by local Jewish communities, who 
were often opposed to Jewish nationalism. In 1907, a letter was sent from the 
chief rabbinate in Istanbul to the Interior Ministry complaining that a Jewish 
newspaper published in Palestine written in the Hebrew language called Ha-
Shḳafah had published articles against the chief rabbinate and religious 
officials in Jerusalem, accusing the paper of stirring up discord and hatred 
(iḫtilāfve münāferet) among the Jews.26 It was accompanied by a letter from 
the governorate of Jerusalem advocating the appointment of a salaried official 
responsible to the censor who was competent in the Hebrew language.27 This 
was a rather pressing problem; as there was no-one in the censorship office 
who was competent in Hebrew (sansur meʾmūriyetin lisān-ı ʿİbrānīye vuḳūfu 
olmamasından), there was no Ottoman official monitoring Hebrew newspapers 
                                                          
24 Ibid., 735. 
25 See: Oren Soffer, Mass Communication in Israel: Nationalism, Globalization and 
Segmentation, trans. Judith Yalon (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 26ff. 
26 BOA, DH.MKT/1155/40, Dersaʿādet ḫāḫāmḫānesi ve tevābiʿi, no. 241, 25 Muharrem 1325 
/20 Şubat 1322 (10 March 1907). 
27 Ibid., Ḳudüs-ü Şerīf mutaṣarrıflıġı, no. 86, 18 Şaban 1325 / 13 Eylül 1323 (26 September 
1907). 
 
like Ha-Shḳafah.28 This issue had arisen earlier in a case in 1899 concerning 
a “Mrs Hemda bint Şlomlo, one of the subjects of the Sublime State residing 
in Jerusalem and a member of the Jewish congregation” (Ḳudüs-ü Şerīf’de 
müḳīme tebeʿa-ı Devlet-i ʿAliye’den ve Mūsevī cemāʿatından), who had 
published a number of articles in Ha-Shḳafah.29 This was, in fact, Hemda Ben-
Yehuda, wife of the major force in Hebrew revivalism, Eliʿezer Ben-Yehuda, 
and in her own right a major Hebrew revivalist and journalist, who was 
seeking permission to publish a scientific treatise (fennī bir risāle) in Arabic 
and Hebrew on the subject of women’s qualities (ḳādınların evṣāf). A 
responsible officer (müdīr-i mesʾul) was to be appointed to monitor the 
publication, another Ottoman Jewish subject named Borowicz; fears of 
Jewish separatism in the Hebrew press led to the recruitment of Hebrew-
speaking censors. 
An even earlier case shows the local reception of nationalist rhetoric. In 
1894, the Jerusalem governorate dispatched a letter to the Interior Ministry 
detailing a scandal that had erupted as a result of an article published in Ha-
Tzevi by “a Russian subject” (Rusya tebeʿasından) writing under the 
anonymous name ‘Shenhi’.30 The problems arose from an opinion piece 
entitled ‘Commandments That Require Intent’ (Mitzṿot Tzarikhot Kaṿanah), a 
reference to a Jewish theological position that divine commandments can only 
be truly fulfilled if one intended to fulfil them in the first place, as opposed to 
an accidental or incidental fulfilment. After a discussion of the story of the 
approaching festival of Hanukkah, the article criticised Jews for meditating 
on abstract theological questions and not taking practical steps to strengthen 
the Jewish nation, as had, in the author’s opinion, the hero of the Hanukkah 
story, Judah Maccabeus. The final paragraph, a call to action, provides the 
text that proved so controversial: 
 
We do not pretend [to have] the heart of this great and enlightened hero, 
to take his ethics and stir in ourselves this sacred emotion, to love our 
people and the land of our fathers with the might of the heart and the 
strength of the spirit (ke- ḥazaḳ lev u-be-ometz ruaḥ leʾahavat ʿamenu u-
leeretz avoteinu), to enjoin a man to his brother so that we will have one 
heart and one will, so that we will stand firm and stand tall, to do all that 
we have forgotten to do, and to not despair in the face of calamity, to defend 
our honour, to defend our spirit, to gather strength and go forward – 
                                                          
28Ibid., Dāḥiliye mektūbi ḳalemi, no. 457, 20 Ramazan 1325 / 14 Teşrin-I Evvel 1323 (27 
October 1907). 
29 BOA, DH.MKT 2217/105, Dāḥiliye mektūbi ḳalemi, no.346/1, 22 Safer 1317 / 19 Haziran 
1315 (1 July 1899). 
30 BOA, DH.MKT 196/26, Ḳudüs-ü Şerīf Mutaṣarrıflıġı, taḥrīrāt ḳalemi, no. 71, 4 Şaban 1311 
/ 29 Kanun-u Sani 1309 (10 February 1894). 
 
forward, and not as a cancer that goes backwards and pours through our 
veins (ḳadimah ṿe-lo ke-ṣarṭan haholekh aḥoranit, ṿe-sheyizal be-ʿoreḳeinu) 
– whether a little or a lot – for the great man’s respected blood that was 
spilled for his people and his land, still fresh in the annals of history. If we 
did this, then we could truly make the blessing: ‘[Blessed are you, lord our 
God, king of the universe], who has granted us life, sustained us, and 
enabled us to reach this occasion.’31 
 
This final phrase, the Jewish blessing over things new or renewed, clearly 
referred to a Jewish national revival through unity and communal struggle. 
The Ottoman authorities in Jerusalem certainly picked up on the intent, 
explaining Hanukkah (ʿidü’l-isrāc) as “the commemoration of the rescue of the 
synagogue [i.e. the Jewish temple] from the grip of Roman occupation in the 
time of an Israelite called Judah Maccabeus” (İsrāʾil’den Yehūẕā Makābī nām 
ẕātın zamānında Romalıların yed istīlāsından ḥavret taḫlīṣini teẕkār).32 The 
implication that the Ottoman Empire might be a similar occupying force was 
troubling, not least because the Ottomans were wont to describe their state 
as Rūm, the direct descendent of Roman authority (even though in the 
Hanukkah story Hellenic Seleucids were the enemy). Because of the radical 
and inflammatory content of the article, the governor’s letter condemned it as 
“exciting the Jews and fomenting civil strife” (Mūsevīleri tehyīc ve fitneye 
müteḥarrık yolında). It was deemed to have violated the third article of the 
Press Law of 1864 forbidding critical or threatening writing against the 
government, and the newspaper was referred to the court of fines (maḥkeme-
i ʿāʾide). 
The Ottoman authorities were not the only ones alarmed by this newspaper 
article. The chief Sephardic rabbi of Palestine, Yaʿakov Shaʾul Elyashar, 
together with the chief Ashkenazi rabbi, Shmuʾel Salant, issued a forceful 
declaration, ‘A Public Protest’ (Meḥaʾah Gluiyah), renouncing the article in 
both communal and patriotic terms: 
 
And here we make faithfully known that we, as with all the congregation 
of Israel that rests under the shade of the government of our lord, our king, 
His Majesty the Sultan, are faithful subjects of His Majesty our mighty 
King, and of his righteous and just ministers (ṿe-hinenu modiʿim 
neʾemanah she anaḥnu ke-kol hamon Yisra⁠ʾel ha-yoshvim beṭoḥ be-tzel 
memshelat adonenu malkenu ha-śulṭan yarom hodo, hinenu ʿavadim 
neʾemanim le-malkenu ha-adir yar[om] h[odo] u-le-śaraṿ asher le-tzedeḳṿe-
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lemishpaṭ yishoru), and that we have no responsibility for any of the 
aforementioned things found in the said article – that is, no man from 
among the Children of Israel besides the aforesaid writer – as with all 
things published at any time in Ha-Tzevi, so that we have no knowledge of 
them and no responsibility falls on us at all; and may there be peace upon 
Israel.33 
 
The reaction of the Jerusalemite Jewish authorities represents a firm rejection 
of Jewish nationalism in favour of an Ottoman identity based on loyalty to the 
sultan. Indeed, the letter from the Jerusalem governorate emphasised that 
the protest revealed “the loyalty, sincerity, and subservience of all the Jews to 
the Eternal Ottoman State” (bi’l-cümle-i Mūsevīlerin Devlet-i Ebediyet-i 
ʿOsmāniye’ye ṣadıḳ ve ḫulūṣ ve ʿubūdiyetleri).34 
This incident reveals the tensions between Jewish nationalists and the 
Ottoman state, and between nationalist and non-nationalist Jews developing 
less than two decades after the beginning of the period of major Jewish 
immigration to Palestine. Any rhetoric hinting at Jewish separatism was 
monitored and suppressed by the Ottoman authorities, struggling on a 
number of fronts against developing national movements among ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious minorities. In addition, the public denouncement of 
Ha-Tzevi’s article by both the Sephardic and Ashkenazi religious authorities 
represents a certain form of loyalism towards the Ottoman state. Questioning 
the actions of the Ottoman government, let alone actively inciting Jewish 
separatism, not only saw the newspaper publically rejected by Jewish officials 
– in Hebrew – but was described by the Ottoman authorities as inciting fitne, 
or strife and division, among Palestine’s Jews, the same term that the 
parliamentary deputy Nisim Mazelyah had used to describe İsmaʿil Hakkı’s 
inflammatory speech in 1910. In a debate on Zionism in the Ottoman 
parliament in 1911, an exchange between Nisim Mazelyah, Ebüzziya Tevfik – 
the publisher, who was also a deputy for Antalya – and Ruhi El-Halidi Bey, 
the deputy for Jerusalem, revealed an attitude towards Zionism and Ottoman 
patriotism: 
 
Nisim Mazelyah: [To Ruhi El-Halidi] In the statements that you have put 
forward so far, you have unearthed something unknown to the 
Government today; that is, you have declared the existence of a Jewish 
Government in the Land of Palestine, about which we knew nothing. You 
have explained today that, inside the Ottoman realms, there exists an 
Israelite government. (Cries of ‘No’). 
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 Ebüzziya Tevfik: [Interjecting] There is a goal revealed in this secret. It is 
certain that you know about it. 
 
Ruhi El-Halidi: If you want my opinion, I will explain it to you, sir. Now, as 
for their opinions – I will not try to dictate the opinions you might hold 
about Zionism. And, not all of the Ottoman Jews are Zionists – those that 
are Zionist, I believe, are not patriotic men (Siyonist olanlar, bendenizce 
vatanperver adamlar değildirler). This is because they hold the idea of 
establishing a state within the state. And they have embraced the idea of 
a Jewish State, which exists at present; even Jacques Behar proposed it. 
This idea is held by all Zionists (Bu fikir, bütün Siyonistlerde mevcuttur).35 
 
The acerbic interjection of Ebüzziya Tevfik – forgetting his earlier remorse at 
questioning the loyalty of a fellow Ottoman – insinuating that Nisim Mazelyah 
was party to this Zionist conspiracy, is telling of the increasingly blurred lines 
between Jewish and Zionist identities based on anti-Semitism. Equally 
damaging, however, was Ruhi El-Halidi’s contention that Zionists were not 
patriotic men (vatanperver adamlar değildirler), implying that as a 
homogeneous group they were separate from the Ottoman civic community 
because of their own separatism. 
The status of the Jewish nationalists was complicated by the fact that 
many of them retained foreign citizenship. During the 1911 Zionism debate –
coincidently held on the same day as a reading for the new Passport Law –
Hasan Şükrü Bey, the deputy for Syria, complained about the nature of 
Jewish settlement in Palestine, focusing particularly on the village of Zamarin, 
today’s Zikhron Yaʿakov, as an example of a settlement populated by 
foreigners.36 The question of nationality was crucial for landownership, but 
also for legal jurisdiction, with Hasan Şükrü arguing that foreign Jews 
avoided Ottoman justice and legal obligations through their foreign 
citizenship: “By producing his Russian passport at the police station”, the 
deputy declared, “he abnegates his Ottomanism” (Zabıta Dairesinde Rusya’nın 
pasaportunu çıkarar, Osmanlılığını inkâr eder).37 Foreign citizenship posed a 
challenge to an Ottoman identity based on legal equality, and this episode 
also provides an insight into the role of symbols in articulating the 
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relationship between subject and state, with a passport issued in the name of 
the sultan representing much more than a travel document in terms of civic 
responsibilities and identities.38 This became a crucial issue for Zionism in 
Palestine due to Zionism’s primary aim of purchasing land for settlement. 
Ottoman land regulations had been tightened with foreign Jewish settlers in 
mind, with a ban on further foreign immigration in 1892 only tempered a year 
later through the pressure of the European powers.39 
The question of identity, immigration, and land featured prominently in 
the Hebrew press of Palestine. Ḥavatzelet angered the Interior Ministry in 
1893 with an article criticising the land regulations. A front-page article 
complained about the prohibition on selling land to foreign Jews, particularly 
those from Russia, claiming that whereas the regulation forbidding the sale 
of land to foreign Jews had been discarded in the provinces of Beirut and 
Damascus, it remained in force in Jerusalem and its environs.40 The author’s 
verdict is clear and damning, lamenting “how much worse this decree has 
been to the Jewish landowners” (ʿad kamah heraʿah ha-gzerah le-yehudim 
baʿalei ḳarḳaʿot), by creating an unstable property market.41 To temper the 
criticism, protestations of loyalty to the sultan came into play, and the 
following Hebrew conclusion was also translated into Ottoman Turkish in an 
accompanying note: 
 
The eyes of all Israel inhabiting our city look longingly towards 
the day that God will show mercy on his people, and that His 
Majesty, our lord, the benevolent and merciful sultan, will annul 
the decree that has led so many of his loyal subjects to disaster.42 
 
This brings into question the very idea of citizenship. These foreign Jews were 
not permitted to purchase land, not because they were Jews per se, but 
because they were Russian subjects. To then appeal to the Ottoman 
authorities on the basis that they were the sultan’s “loyal subjects” – ʿavadav 
ha-neʾemanim in Hebrew and translated as tebeʿa-ı ṣādıḳları in Ottoman 
Turkish – assumed that all those living under imperial protection were the 
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sultan’s subjects; in other words, asserting the rights of citizens without the 
legal process of citizenship.43 
A similar article, published a few days later in the same paper by Yaʿakov 
Orenstein, ‘A Clear Reproach’ (Tokhaḥat Migoleh), gave a more nationalist take 
on the crisis, with the opening paragraph defining the adjective “nationalism” 
(leʾumiyut) as “a demand from each person to risk his life for his brother, to 
empathise with collective distress, to love the land of his birth, and to sacrifice 
his body and his wealth on the beloved altar of his nation”.44 Berating the 
Jewish community for forgetting their brothers in the face of “every evil 
decree” (kol gzerah raʿah) and for failing to stand up to “our persecutors” 
(rodfeinu), Oreinstein also strongly criticised the Ottoman government for the 
land regulations. 
The Ottoman note with the article indicates that this sort of open dissent 
over the issue of the purchase of property and land (emlāk ve ārāżī) was 
troubling, not least given the foreign connections of many of the settlers, but 
also because it was difficult to enforce this policy at the local level.45 However, 
land purchase for non-Ottoman subjects remained very difficult, and 
therefore the issue of Ottomanising through Ottoman citizenship was to 
become crucial to consolidating and furthering Zionist settlement. 
 
Ottomanism as Ottomanisation 
 
In the 1911 parliamentary Zionism debate, Hasan Şükrü described the 
inhabitants of a Zionist settlement, claiming that they played their own 
anthem at their special occasions, and, “in place of the Ottoman flag, they fly 
the Zion Flag, which is blue with a Seal of Solomon in the middle and ‘Zion’ 
written above.”46 The Ottoman flag, a symbol of unity under one ruler and one 
system, was thus challenged by a new banner representing a nationalist 
movement. In a prior parliamentary debate in 1910 about state finances, the 
Salonican Jewish deputy ʿEmanüʾel Karasu Efendi was challenged over his 
downplaying of the importance of the Zionism question by both Ruhi el-Halidi 
and Hasan Şükrü: 
 
Ruhi el-Halidi: Karasu Efendi, this is not right. The Zionism question is a 
question of significant importance for the country. 
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 ʿEmanüʾel Karasu: I did not say that it is not important. 
 
Ruhi el-Halidi: Don’t say it’s an unimportant question, it is incredibly 
important, it has consequences. 
 
Hasan Şükrü: Look, they are using their own postage stamps... (Showing 
a postage stamp)47 
 
The dramatic brandishing of a Zionist postal stamp – presumably one of those 
produced by the Jewish National Fund – was sufficient evidence for Hasan 
Şükrü of Zionist separatism. This returns to the common theme: that the 
Zionists were building a “state within a state” (memleketin dahilinden bir 
memleket), and that by rejecting Ottoman symbols they were not patriotic 
Ottomans. The focus on flags and stamps makes sense if we take Hasan 
Kayalı’s definition of Ottomanism, formed during the Tanzimat, as “a common 
allegiance of all subjects in equal status to the Ottoman dynasty”, based on a 
loose framework of symbols rather than institutions, later supplanted by more 
formal structures during the Young Ottoman, Hamidian, and Young Turk 
periods but still with the focus of loyalty to the state via the Ottoman 
sultan.4847 In other words, national or religious affiliations were to be 
overcome by a unifying imperial identity of symbolic and performative 
Ottomanism. Choosing to use a different flag, a different postage stamp – let 
alone a different passport – was thus a rejection of such unity. The Hebrew-
language newspapers of Palestine explored this conundrum in two ways; 
through loyalism towards the sultan and, after the 1908 Revolution, through 
Ottomanisation. 
For much of the later 19th century, the sultan was the focus of expressions 
of Hebrew loyalism. For instance, the accession of Murad V in May 1876 was 
greeted in Ḥavatzelet with a front-page declaration of loyalty and prayers for 
the sultan’s life and prosperity.4948 It was during the reign of ʿAbdülhamid II, 
however, that such print loyalism came into its own. In 1894, Ḥavatzelet, 
which targeted both Old and New Yishuv members, published a front-page 
editorial in honour of the sultan’s birthday. Underneath the title, “Long Live 
the King!” (Yeḥi ha-Melekh), which was flanked on either side by two Ottoman 
crescents and two Stars of David, the article provided a narrative of the 
celebrations: 
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To honour the day, thousands of flags were raised above the houses of the 
city and the governor’s palace, and the officials of the exalted government, 
the various religious leaders, and the representatives of the [foreign] 
governments resident in our city came to the governor’s palace to deliver 
their blessings to honour the governor of our city. Among those who came 
were the esteemed rabbi, the First to Zion, the valued and important 
Ḥakham-bashi, accompanied by the esteemed rabbi, the head of the rabbis, 
the valued and important Shmuʾel Salant, and other honoured members 
of the Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities. That night, the people of our 
city made illuminations to celebrate the holiday, and army musicians 
delighted the heart of the people who gathered in their thousands through 
playing around the governor’s palace and the army bases.50 
 
The crucial part of this celebration was that Jerusalem’s Jews participated in 
an event “celebrated by all the inhabitants of our city” (ḥaganu kol toshvei 
ʿireinu) and “with our brothers living in our city” (aḥinu toshvei ʿireinu). In 
other words, it was a communal and public act of patriotism. The number of 
celebrations of the sultan given front-page prominence in Ḥavatzelet in the 
1890s and 1900s with similar narratives and patriotic designs for the Ḥag ha-
Melekh – the King’s Festival – demonstrates not only perhaps a fear of 
Hamidian censorship, but the use of Hebrew print culture to participate in 
civic Ottomanism. A typical example is the front page of Ḥavatzelet of 31 
August 1894, which, to celebrate the sultan’s accession-day carried the 
headline ‘ ☪ Julus Humayun ☪ ’, a transliteration of the Ottoman cülūs-u 
hümāyūn, the imperial enthronement, and emphasised that this was 
something celebrated by “all the subjects of the king, all the children of the 
different religions living in Turkey” (kol ʿavadei ha-melekh, kol bnei ha-datot 
ha-shunot ha-yoshvim be-Togarmah).51 For ʿAbdülhamid II’s Silver Jubilee in 
September 1900, the front page of the paper had a prayer and a blessing for 
the sultan to be recited in all of the synagogues and seminaries, which itself 
included an egalitarian call to God to “please receive today the prayer of the 
many nations settled in our land” (ḳabel na ha-yom tefilat ʿ amim rabim yoshvei 
artzeinu).52 Beyond such formal occasions, Ḥavatzelet praised the sultan for 
being a fighter against anti-Semitism in his realms, with one front-page story 
printing an imperial command “to prevent the printing of any anti-Semitic 
publication or bringing it from anywhere into Turkey”.53 Such protection was 
repaid in major national events such as the Ottoman victory over Greece in 
1897, with the front page of Ḥavatzelet of 11 June 1897 printing a telegram 
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from the sultan to the chief rabbinate declaring that “His Majesty was very 
satisfied to see the patriotism [lit. love of the land of birth, ahavat eretz 
muledet] and spirit of loyalty to his government that the Jews never ceased to 
display”.54 
“Long Live the Sultan!” was a clear and simple slogan by which the Hebrew-
speaking immigrant Jews could show their loyalty to and affiliation with the 
Ottoman state. The Constitutional Revolution of 1908, however, brought a 
new discourse into play. The arrival on 27 July 1908 of the news of the 
restoration of the constitution was greeted with a huge headline in Ḥavatzelet, 
‘House of the People’s Representatives in Turkey’ (Beit Nivḥarei ha-ʿAm be-
Togarmah), printing a précis of the command announcing that, by the sultan’s 
gracious order, the constitution (sefer ha-ḥuḳim ha-yesodi) would be back in 
force for all Ottomans.55 The opening of the parliament in 1908 was celebrated 
in a rather different way to how it had been reported in its first incarnation in 
1877, when there had been simply narrative reporting and reprints of 
speeches.56 On 18 December 1908, the front page of Ḥavatzelet was adorned 
with crescents with Stars of David, the same aesthetic and narrative as the 
articles celebrating loyalty to the sultan, cheering, “The Ottoman Parliament! 
Long Live the Sultan! Long Live the Constitution!”: 
 
Today was a celebration of the Ottomans in every city of the land 
of Turkey, for today His Majesty the Sultan opened the Parliament 
with a speech that he gave in person. In our city, as in every city 
in Turkey, we celebrated this day in a glorious and majestic 
manner, flying thousands of flags on every house and shop, on 
every roof and ceiling.57 
 
At night, there were illuminations and music from the military band, but for 
Ḥavatzelet the implications of the revolution itself were a sufficient reason for 
celebration, and the focus of the article on its potential repercussions marks 
this as different from earlier loyal declarations to the monarch alone: 
 
The hearts of the happy population would increase in joy even 
without the music, through the freedom that has been given to 
them, through the renewed constitution, and through the hope 
that they hold that the glorious prosperity of the land, the quality 
of the produce, and the majesty of labour will increase, and true 
peace will fall across the land, inside and out.58 
                                                          
54 Ḥavatzelet, 11 Sivan 5657 / 11 June 1897. 
55 Ḥavatzelet, 28 Tammuz 5668 / 27 July 1908. A similarly loyal front page appeared in Ha-   
Shḳafah, 29 Tammuz 5668 / 28 July 1908.  
56 Ḥavatzelet, 28 Nisan 5637 / 11 April 1877. 
57 Ḥavatzelet, 24 Kislev 5669 / 18 December 1908. 
58 Ibid. 
Such a poetic ideal of the post-constitutional phase mixed with the Zionist 
dream of the redemption and settlement of the land, so that through an 
Ottoman utopia a Jewish national golden age would be forged in Palestine. 
However, after the drama of revolution, counter-revolution, and 
constitutional reform came serious reflection. In June 1913, Nahum 
Taversky, a Russian Zionist immigrant living in Jerusalem, penned an article 
for the Zionist-socialist newspaper Ha-Poʿel Ha-Tzaʿyir.59 With a focus on 
improving and developing the Jewish economic presence in Palestine, the 
paper published a number of literary and political articles aimed at raising 
the profile of Hebrew as a language of political discourse, and of the labour 
Zionist project in general. Taversky’s article, ‘On Our Political Situation in the 
Land [of Israel]’ (Le-Matzavenu ha-Poliṭi ba-Aretz), lamented the results of the 
local and municipal elections held in the summer of 1913, speaking of “a 
difficult defeat upon the landscape of local political life” (mapalah ḳashah ʿal 
śdeh ha-ḥayim ha-poliṭim hameḳomiyim), with very few Jews represented on 
local councils.60 Angered at the lack of collective action to further the aims of 
Jewish communities and workers, Taversky turned on other Hebrew 
newspapers and writers, particularly Eliʿezer Ben-Yehuda’s campaign for 
Ottomanisation (hitʿatmanut) run in Ha-Tzevi in 1909: 
 
The Ottomanism question (sheʾelat ha-ʿOtmaniyut) in its new form of public 
politics (tziburit-medinit) was born with the declaration of the Constitution, 
and here we are today five years on; however, it is noteworthy that, despite 
it being so very important to us, the serious nature of this question is not 
clear to us to this day, and almost never occupies space either in our 
newspapers or in our communities. In the first year, Mr Ben-Yehuda wrote 
a few articles agitating in favour of Ottomanisation, for a whole year 
printing in his newspaper the stereotypical proclamation, “Jews, Be 
Ottomans”, but this agitation achieved nothing, and the proclamation is 
used in jokes and nothing more. […] Another thing is clear: the Ottoman 
[i.e. Ottomanised] part of our community is weak not only in quantity, but 
also, and perhaps especially, in quality. They do not know what the 
political issues are for the Sephardim, the various Arab Jews, the 
Yemenites (none of the Ottomans have ever known about these). They do 
not even understand the issues of the Ashkenazim, from whose numbers 
so many Ottomans come, particularly in Jerusalem, one little bit. None of 
that mob knows, even to this very day, anything about modern public life, 
not to mention modern political life. The number of people who know how 
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to read and write in the language of the state [i.e. Ottoman Turkish] is very 
small indeed. They could only find two or three out of all the Ottoman 
community who could communicate with the representatives of the 
government, whilst our new community, the non-Ottoman community, 
appointed tens of people. Some among them believe that no obstacles can 
block the path to their Ottomanisation (sheshum mekhshulim lo yakhlu 
laʿamod ʿal derekh hitʿatmanutam).61 
 
For Taversky, Ottomanisation was a shallow response to the post-1908 
political landscape, a response that could not further the aims of other forms 
of Jewish nationalism. None of these new Ottoman Jews could speak Ottoman 
Turkish – a sign of their political impotency, since knowledge of Ottoman 
Turkish was a requirement of election to the parliament. The ‘Ottomans’ were 
a divisive part of the Jewish yishuv, full of rhetoric but with little substance 
behind their newly adopted identity. For Taversky, the popular politics of the 
new political era would be defined by Jewish workers and Jewish solidarity, 
not by the ‘joke’ of Ottomanisation. 
The object of Taversky’s rage was a series of articles published in Ha-Tzevi 
between January and April 1909, encouraging foreign Jews in Palestine to 
‘Ottomanise’ by adopting Ottoman citizenship. According to the first of these 
manifestos, presented in the edition of 12 January, this was to enable Jews 
to rise from their current low position in Ottoman society and as a people –
“poor and empty are we!” (dalim ve reiḳim anu) was his refrain – by increasing 
their numbers in Ottoman elections: “If we were now, at this moment, all of 
us Ottomans, how many thousands of voters we would have, and so how 
many people would have the right to be elected!”62 The refrain, “Jews, Be 
Ottomans!” (Yehudim, hayu ʿOtmanim!) was carried as a slogan in almost 
every issue of the paper from 12 January until 1 April 1909 to encourage 
immigrant Jewish participation in the Ottoman electoral process which, as 
foreign subjects, they were unable to do. 
A follow-up article, ‘The Jews and Ottomanism: A Reply to Mr Barzilai’ (Ha- 
Yehudim ve ha-ʿOtomanut: Teshuvah le-ha-Adon Barzilai), on 31 January 
again pushed for the importance of taking Ottoman citizenship to get a bigger 
say in Parliament, signed off under the pen name ‘Ottoman citizen’ (natin 
ʿOtmani).63 This was a response to an article written in an earlier edition of 
the same paper by Yehoshuʿa Barzilai, a prolific writer for the Zionist cause 
whose short stories were often serialised in Ha-Tzevi. In his article, ‘A Little 
Restraint’ (Meʿaṭ Metinut), Barzilai agreed with the general premise of “Jews, 
Be Ottomans!” in terms of Jewish nationalism: 
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 [Ottomanisation], in itself, is positive, since it is impossible to become 
naturalised citizens in the Land [of Israel] and to permanently be settled in 
perpetuity without being citizens of the state. It is true that we hold a 
nationalist hope in the land of our fathers, and that we hope for the 
realisation of the Zionist idea in our generation and in our days, but even 
then we will surely be Ottoman citizens (emet ki lanu yesh tiḳṿah leʾumit ʿal 
eretz avoteinu ṿe-ki anu meḳaṿim lehitgashmut ha-raʿiyon ha-tziyoni 
bedoreinu u-be-yameinu, aval gam az halo nehiyeh netinim ʿOtomanim).64 
 
This, then, presents something quite interesting, in that Barzilai saw that 
Jewish nationhood could be realised within the Ottoman community; Zionism 
would arise through embracing Ottomanism. Indeed, in a pamphlet published 
in 1912, ‘A Little Bit of State’ (Ḳorṭov Medinah), he articulated his adversity to 
“political Zionism” (Tziyonut medinit) in favour of a “Zionist state” (medinah 
Tziyonit), a limited polity based on institutions and networks – what Esther 
Benbassa has described as a form of “autochthonous social and cultural 
Zionism.”65 Speaking of the need to discard Herzlian Zionism, he extolled the 
virtues of building Jewish institutions under Ottoman authority and as 
Ottomans: 
 
The Ottoman government does not interfere with the local rule of any of 
the nations or languages settled inside it, nor with internal autonomy (ha-
oyṭonamiyut ha-pnimit). If we, the Children of Israel settled in Ottomania, 
do not enjoy these rights, then we should look to ourselves for this, for our 
habits, our customs, and our public manners that we have brought with 
us from the Diaspora are to blame, but absolutely not the Ottoman 
government, which does not have it in its nature, methods, and laws to 
interfere in the internal life of any of its populations (aval beshum ofen lo 
ha memshalah ha-ʿOtmanit she-ʿein miṭivaʿah darkah ṿe-ḥukeyhah 
lehitʿarev ba ḥayim ha-pnimiyim shel eizeh tzibur she-hu). If you do not 
believe this, please, go and try to establish such high schools, such a “Tel 
Aviv”, such settlements, and such primary schools in another country like 
those we have made in the Ottoman Land of Israel (ba-Eretz Yiśraʾel ha-
ʿOtomanit). In short, the government does not interfere at all in our internal 
life, and when it does intervene, things are resolved in a welcome manner.66 
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 Ottomanism for Barzilai was enjoying political and cultural autonomy within 
a polity that neither persecuted Jews nor hindered their national projects, of 
which settling the land – the “redemption of the Land of Israel” – was the most 
important thing. The construction of a separate nation state was out of the 
question because it would remove the protection of the Ottoman authorities, 
whose inclusive political ideology, a sort of e pluribus unum (or at least in 
varietate unitas), permitted the Jews to build a new national community as 
both Jews and Ottomans.67 Moreover, in his article in Ha Tzevi, Barzilai was 
concerned about the diplomatic and political implications of large numbers of 
foreign Jews suddenly applying for Ottoman citizenship, concluding that 
proper legal advice would need to be sought to present a petition to the 
Ottoman parliament, with a considered proposal that would need to be 
endorsed by the Great Powers.68 
The question of Ottomanisation moved increasingly from the ink of the 
pages of Hebrew-language newspapers to daily politics throughout the empire 
following the CUP coup of 1913.69 An article in the nationalist Sephardic paper 
Ha-Ḥerut of 28 October 1913 described a polemic war between two Ottoman 
newspapers, the anti-CUP İḳdām (Effort) and the pro-CUP and Zionist run Le 
Jeune Turc (The Young Turk), over the proposal for a Hebrew college in 
Jerusalem, denying firmly that Zionism was a political conspiracy against the 
Ottoman state.70 In April 1914, Ha-Ḥerut responded to criticism from the 
Arabic publication Al-Karmil (The Carmel) that foreign Jews had no intention 
of becoming Ottoman citizens, retorting that “the foreign Jews coming to our 
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land came with the intention to be Ottomanised!” (ha-Yehudim ha-zarim ha-
ba⁠ʾim le-artzenu baʾim be-khaṿanah teḥilah lehitʿatmen).71 The paper urged 
Hebew newspaper propagandists to encourage Hebrew speakers in Palestine 
(ha-yishuv ha-ʿIvri ha-Eretzyiśraʾeli) to take up Ottoman citizenship to prove 
their loyalty.72 The chief of these propagandists, Eliʿezer Ben-Yehuda, used 
Ha-Or at the outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914 to push a number of 
agendas, including “the need to adapt” (tzarikh lehistagel) to Ottoman society, 
and the need to enlist in the army.73 The latter aim was pushed in a patriotic 
article of 9 August 1914, ‘Day of the Young Hebrews’ (Yom ha-Tzaʿyirim ha-
ʿIvrim), in which enlistment in the Ottoman army was portrayed as a key to 
Jewish success in Palestine: “when the necessary time comes, together and 
shoulder-to-shoulder with the children of the other Ottoman nations (yaḥdaṿ 
ṿe-shekhem eḥad ʿim bnei sheʾar ha-leʾumim ha-ʿOtmanim) you will be serving 
for the greatness of Ottomania… And, to add in French, ‘l’union fait la force!’’74 
The Ottoman entry into World War I, in November 1914, changed the 
dynamic of the situation entirely. On 6 November, Ben-Yehuda resumed his 
“Jews, Be Ottomans” campaign, but shared the front page with two other 
articles.75 The first was about a parade held in Jaffa to demonstrate support 
for the government and the army, in which a “wonderful procession” 
(tahalukhah nehederet) of the Jewish community had made its way from Tel 
Aviv to Jaffa, led by the students and teachers of Jaffa College (Midrashah 
Yafoʾit), the Hope of Israel School (Miḳṿeh-Yiśraʾel), and the Hebrew School 
(Beit ha-Sefer ha-ʿIvri).76 The other article, however, rather complicated such 
displays of Hebrew loyalty. It was a letter to the editor from a senior postal 
official, Emin Bey, announcing that letters would only be permitted in 
Turkish, Arabic, French, and German.77 On one sheet of paper, we have three 
major issues facing the Zionist community in late 1914: the rush for foreign 
Jews, particularly those with now enemy (i.e. Russian) passports, to obtain 
Ottoman citizenship; attempts to maintain displays of loyalty to the state; and 
increasingly repressive state measures. 
Undeterred, Ben-Yehuda began a campaign throughout November to 
promote the Ottomanisation of the immigrant Jews of Palestine. On 15 
November 1914, the headline of Ha-Or proclaimed, “‘Jews, Be Ottomans! Cast 
Off Your Foreign Names and Call Yourselves by Hebrew Names!”78 Such a 
declaration seems at first to be a non sequitur: what did Hebrew names have 
to do with being Ottomans? Ben-Yehuda’s reasons that the mitʿatmanim 
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should get rid of their foreign names, particularly surnames with endings like 
-ski, -vitz and -ov, combined his particular vision for Hebrew-centred Zionist 
nationalism, Ottomanism, and pragmatism:  
 
How ugly they are to the ear and the eye for a Jewish man in the land of 
his forefathers! Here is the day you became Ottomans, full citizens of the 
land in which you live (ezraḥim gmurim shel zo ha-eretz she-atem yoshvim 
bah), so why do you always recall through your surnames your foreign 
origins of exile (motzaʾakhem ha-nokhri ha-galuti)? Why would you 
proclaim your foreign names to the ears of those who criticise us (be-oznei 
ha-meḳaṭregim ʿaleinu) because you live here in the Land [of Israel]? Why 
do you presume to bequeath this ugly inheritance to your descendants, 
who will certainly be ashamed and who may suffer as a result of this, and 
for whom it will be difficult to repair this damage?79 
 
Adopting Hebrew names – a list of acceptable names was provided in the 
editions between 16 and 18 November – was therefore linked to both a Zionist 
and Ottomanist patriotic ideal. Shedding their Russian names removed both 
an enemy and a diasporic stigma, but it also allowed them to remain in 
Palestine and not be removed as enemy aliens. 
Over the next week, the Ottomanisation campaign featured prominently in 
the pages of Ha-Or, as it had in Ha-Tzevi a few years earlier. Others involved 
in Ben-Yehuda’s Ottomanisation Committee (Ṿaʿad ha-Hitʿatmanut) joined the 
push, such as David Yellin, another major Hebrew revivalist and educator, 
who wrote an article in Ha-Or, ‘To Ottomanisation’ (Le-ha-Hitʿatmanut), in 
which he described the relationship between the Jewish settlers and the 
Ottoman state: 
 
And if every man is to be a citizen of this land, in order to benefit himself 
individually and in order to be useful in the land in which he lives, 
whichever it may be, it is of extreme importance for us Jews to take on the 
citizenship of our own land, the mighty land of Turkey. For indeed, this is 
the land that opened its gates to us in the days of barbarism and savagery 
of the Middle Ages, the land of the sultanate of the House of Osman that 
never discriminated between our nation and all the other peoples of its 
wide realms (ki akhen zot ha-aretz asher be-yamei ha-barbariyut ṿe-hapra 
ʾut, yamei ha-beinayim, patḥah sheʿareiyah lefaneinu, ṿe-eleh śalṭaniyah le-
beit ʿOtman asher lo heflu me-ʿolam bein benei ʿamenu ṿe-kol yeter toshvei 
mamlakhtam ha-reḥavah).80 
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The historical narrative of the Ottoman state rescuing the Jews of Spain was 
a common trope. It had been used almost thirty years earlier in Ebüzziya 
Tevfik’s Millet-i İsrāʾilīye, and, as Julia Philips Cohen has shown, it continues 
to be retold in relation to the history of the Jews in the Republic of Turkey.81 
This, in many ways, combines a number of the narratives expressed within 
the different sections of the Hebrew press: gratitude for Ottoman sanctuary 
and freedoms, expressions of loyalty to the sultan, and a belief that the aims 
of Zionism, both cultural and political, could be achieved by adopting an 
Ottoman civic identity. Yellin’s claim that the Ottoman state never 
discriminated between Jews and its other subjects gets to the heart of what 
Ottomanism was, echoed in other opinion pieces by other Hebrew revivalists, 
such as A.M. Borochov’s ‘I am a Hebrew!’ (ʿIvri Anochi).82 
A final twist in the “Jews, Be Ottomans” saga comes from an article in the 
13 November 1914 edition of Ha-Ḥerut, aimed at Ottoman Sephardic Jews, ‘To 
My Jewish Brothers!’ (Le-Aḥai ha-Yehudim!), written by the Jerusalemite 
notable Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Ḥusaynī: 
 
I, the undersigned fervent Ottoman (ʿOtmani nilhav), demand justice and 
virtue, know and appreciate the value of my Jewish brothers in the lands 
of Ottomania, and I came to ask you, the children of the people of Israel, 
descendants of the famous heroes David, Solomon, Judah Maccabeus, and 
many more, I came to ask you I say, to remember what the exalted 
government has done for you when you left the land of Spain, that it 
opened its gates and took you in, a people ceaselessly persecuted, a people 
that did not find rest in any land of even one of the governments that they 
set foot upon on their journey. The exalted government showed you a land 
to develop and prosper, and said: “Here before you is the land and 
everything in it, do with it as you see fit.”83 And you dwelled in safety there 
these five hundred years, a man under his vine and under his fig tree. And 
now that these polar bears [i.e. the Russians] are up and about to seek and 
destroy [the land] like vicious wolves, the time has come for you, the 
children faithful to our beloved government, to fulfil your obligations and 
to help with grace and spirit in order to humiliate and overcome the land 
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of your cruel enemies who wanted to cut you off from the nations, and to 
crush the foes of the Ottoman government underfoot. Let’s go, my brothers, 
rise up and help us! Be Ottomans from heart and soul, and in the name of 
God we will succeed (hayu ʿOtmanim mi-lev u-mi-nefesh, ṿe-be-shem 
Hashem naʿaśeh ṿe-natzliaḥ).84 
 
This was the basis of a different kind of demand to ‘be Ottomans’, using 
biblical language and historic narratives of a Jewish military past – including 
Judah Maccabeus, the hero who had got Ha-Tzevi into so much trouble 
twenty years earlier – and arguing not for a shared Hebrew culture or the right 
of settlement, but for the other side of a contract in which being Ottoman 
came with duties. This perhaps chimes with Ben-Yehuda’s cry for the Young 
Hebrews to enlist in the Ottoman armed forces; however, when war did break 
out, Ben-Yehuda was one of many of the Hebrew-speaking Zionists who 
lobbied to exempt the “community of Ottomanised Jews” (ḳahal ha-
mitʿatmanim) from conscription into the Ottoman army. Civic Ottomanism 
clearly had its limits for those who had Ottomanised.85 
 
Conclusions 
 
Ben-Yehuda’s “Jews, Be Ottomans!” campaign in some ways confirmed the 
assertions of Ruhi El-Halidi that Zionists were not truly patriotic Ottomans. 
After all, the sole purpose of gaining Ottoman passports was to remain in 
Palestine, not to truly Ottomanise in a civic or national sense, and al Ḥusaynī’s 
plea to his Jewish brothers to fight the common foe did not really strike a 
chord with the mitʿatmanim. In the Hamidian era, Hebrew-language 
newspapers like Ha-Shḳafah, Ha-Tzevi, and Ḥavatzelet tested the boundaries 
of what the Ottoman authorities and their own co-religionists would tolerate 
in terms of nationalist sentiment, particularly when complaining about 
government-imposed immigration restrictions that necessarily hurt the 
Zionist cause. Polemics such as Shenhi’s, stirring the Jews to active separatist 
nationalism, clearly overstepped the mark, and the state responded by 
instituting Hebrew censors and relying on reports from local officials, both 
state and religious, to monitor these new publications. Indeed, figuring out 
the place of a Zionist or Jewish national identity, be it cultural or more overtly 
political, in the Ottoman political landscape of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries necessarily challenged what Ottomanism actually meant. Labour 
Zionists like Taversky rejected the “Jews, Be Ottomans” slogan in favour of 
“Hebrew Speech and Hebrew Labour” (hadibur ʿIvri ṿe-ha ʿavodah ʿIvrit).86 
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They were the opposite of those who had Ottomanised; they were the bilti-
ʿOtmanim, the non-Ottomans, consciously rejecting an Ottomanist identity. 
On the other side were cultural Zionists like Barzilai, who extolled the benefits 
of living in a non-nation state that did not seek to change the identities of its 
constituent members provided they were loyal to the state and its symbols 
and accepted a broad Ottoman identity. This was Eretz Yiśraʾel ha-ʿOtomanit, 
the Ottoman Land of Israel, in which being Ottoman was the best way to 
secure a protected cultural Zionist community. In some ways, this was 
Ottomanism at its purest, “one citizenship for all subjects”, to use Kemal 
Karpat’s definition, with the creation of a culturally Hebrew and Jewish 
national identity in Palestine providing just another patch in the quilt of 
Ottoman identities.87 
For Ottomanised Jews like Ben-Yehuda, Ottomanism was largely 
something to be performed and displayed, in many respects the essence of 
Ottomanism in practice. In an early discussion in the Ottoman parliament in 
January 1909, the question was raised about instituting an Ottoman 
independence day. Yusuf Kemal Bey, the deputy for Sinop, opined: 
 
I think that the purpose of appointing such a day is as a confirmation of 
the foundations of Ottomanism for all of the Ottoman peoples (bütün efrâd-
ı Osmaniye arasında Osmanlılık esasının teyididir). That is, on that day all 
the Ottoman peoples shall congratulate one another, they shall embrace 
one another.88 
 
When newspapers like Ḥavatzelet reported the participation of the Hebrew 
speaking Jews in official celebrations, they were therefore placing the 
immigrant Jewish community within an Ottomanist milieu; flying the flag, 
cheering the troops, and praising the sultan were crucial elements of what 
one might term performative Ottomanism. What seems to have changed is 
what it meant to be Ottomanised, to become Ottoman. Many of the Hebrew 
authors examined here demanded autonomy, the right to settle, and the right 
to develop their own national culture, praising the Ottoman state for a lack of 
interference. However, Ottomanism, as al-Ḥusaynī tried to convey, was also a 
unification of peoples under common civic duties, something that did not fit 
in with many of these visions of Jewish autonomy. Indeed, the rush to 
Ottomanise in1914 reflected a fear of deportation rather than a desire to 
embrace an Ottomanist ideal. “Jews, Be Ottomans!” was in some ways a 
successor to “Long Live the Sultan!” in providing a slogan for immigrant 
Jewish loyalty in the post-1908 Ottoman political landscape, but if the 
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ultimate aim of Ottomanisation was to ensure the establishment of a separate 
Jewish political, economic, or cultural entity in Palestine, then those who were 
Ottomanised did not really embrace Ottomanism; true Ottomans did not issue 
their own postage stamps. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
